Social Origins of Dictatorships: Elite Networks and Political Transitions in Haiti

Existing theories of democratic reversals emphasize that elites mount actions like coups when democracy is particularly threatening to their interests. However, existing theory has been largely silent on the role of elite social networks, which interact with economic incentives and may facilitate an...

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Veröffentlicht in:The American political science review Jg. 115; H. 3; S. 900 - 916
Hauptverfasser: NAIDU, SURESH, ROBINSON, JAMES A., YOUNG, LAUREN E.
Format: Journal Article
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: New York, USA Cambridge University Press 01.08.2021
Schlagworte:
19th century
Autocracy
Collective action
Coups d'etat
Democracy
Dictators
Dictatorship
Economic incentives
Elites
Evidence
Family Involvement
Government (Administrative Body)
Incentives
International trade
Network Analysis
Network centrality
Political change
Political elites
Political science
Political transition
Politics
Prices
Rents
Social activism
Social Characteristics
Social networks
Social origins
Social structure
Wealth
Haiti
United States > US
ISSN:0003-0554, 1537-5943
Online-Zugang:Volltext
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Zusammenfassung:Existing theories of democratic reversals emphasize that elites mount actions like coups when democracy is particularly threatening to their interests. However, existing theory has been largely silent on the role of elite social networks, which interact with economic incentives and may facilitate antidemocratic collective action. We develop a model where coups generate rents for elites and show that the effort an elite puts into a coup is increasing in their network centrality. We empirically explore the model using an original dataset of Haitian elite networks that we linked to firm-level data. We show that central families were more likely to be accused of participating in the 1991 coup against the democratic Aristide government. We then find that the retail prices of staple goods that are imported by such elites differentially increase during subsequent periods of nondemocracy. Our results suggest that elite social structure is an important factor in democratic reversals.
Bibliographie:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
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ISSN:0003-0554
1537-5943
DOI:10.1017/S0003055421000289