Evolutionary game theory: A renaissance

Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of evolutionary game theory. Furthermore, such behavioral rules are themselves subject to evolutionary forces. Paying...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Games Vol. 9; no. 2; pp. 1 - 67
Main Author: Newton, Jonathan
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Basel MDPI 01.06.2018
MDPI AG
Subjects:
ISSN:2073-4336, 2073-4336
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of evolutionary game theory. Furthermore, such behavioral rules are themselves subject to evolutionary forces. Paying particular attention to the work of young researchers, this essay surveys the progress made over the last decade towards understanding these phenomena, and discusses open research topics of importance to economics and the broader social sciences.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 14
ISSN:2073-4336
2073-4336
DOI:10.3390/g9020031