Privacy and personal data collection with information externalities

We provide a theoretical model of privacy in which data collection requires consumers' consent and consumers are fully aware of the consequences of such consent. Nonetheless, excessive collection of personal information arises in the monopoly market equilibrium which results in excessive loss o...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of public economics Vol. 173; pp. 113 - 124
Main Authors: Choi, Jay Pil, Jeon, Doh-Shin, Kim, Byung-Cheol
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Elsevier B.V 01.05.2019
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ISSN:0047-2727, 1879-2316
Online Access:Get full text
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