Stable matchings of teachers to schools

Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for school or higher education assignment, or for entry-level labour markets. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning teachers to schools. Our model is motivated by a particular char...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Theoretical computer science Vol. 653; pp. 15 - 25
Main Authors:	Cechlárová, Katarína, Fleiner, Tamás, Manlove, David F., McBride, Iain
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	Elsevier B.V 15.11.2016
Subjects:	Computer simulation Education Inapproximability Incentives Lists Markets Matching NP-completeness Polynomial-time algorithm Serial dictatorship Stability Stable matchings Teachers Polynomial-time algorithm Serial dictatorship Inapproximability Stable matchings NP-completeness
ISSN:	0304-3975, 1879-2294
Online Access:	Get full text
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