Stable matchings of teachers to schools

Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for school or higher education assignment, or for entry-level labour markets. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning teachers to schools. Our model is motivated by a particular char...

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Published in:Theoretical computer science Vol. 653; pp. 15 - 25
Main Authors: Cechlárová, Katarína, Fleiner, Tamás, Manlove, David F., McBride, Iain
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Elsevier B.V 15.11.2016
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ISSN:0304-3975, 1879-2294
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Abstract Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for school or higher education assignment, or for entry-level labour markets. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning teachers to schools. Our model is motivated by a particular characteristic of the education system in many countries where each teacher specializes in two subjects. We seek stable matchings, which ensure that no teacher and school have the incentive to deviate from their assignments. Indeed we propose two stability definitions depending on the precise format of schools' preferences. If the schools' ranking of applicants is independent of their subjects of specialism, we show that the problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists is NP-complete, even if there are only three subjects, unless there are master lists of applicants or of schools. By contrast, if the schools may order applicants differently in each of their specialization subjects, the problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists is NP-complete even in the presence of subject-specific master lists plus a master list of schools. Finally, we prove a strong inapproximability result for the problem of finding a matching with the minimum number of blocking pairs with respect to both stability definitions.
AbstractList Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for school or higher education assignment, or for entry-level labour markets. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning teachers to schools. Our model is motivated by a particular characteristic of the education system in many countries where each teacher specializes in two subjects. We seek stable matchings, which ensure that no teacher and school have the incentive to deviate from their assignments. Indeed we propose two stability definitions depending on the precise format of schools' preferences. If the schools' ranking of applicants is independent of their subjects of specialism, we show that the problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists is NP-complete, even if there are only three subjects, unless there are master lists of applicants or of schools. By contrast, if the schools may order applicants differently in each of their specialization subjects, the problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists is NP-complete even in the presence of subject-specific master lists plus a master list of schools. Finally, we prove a strong inapproximability result for the problem of finding a matching with the minimum number of blocking pairs with respect to both stability definitions.
Author McBride, Iain
Manlove, David F.
Cechlárová, Katarína
Fleiner, Tamás
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  organization: School of Computing Science, Sir Alwyn Williams Building, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, G12 8QQ, UK
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Keywords Polynomial-time algorithm
Serial dictatorship
Inapproximability
Stable matchings
NP-completeness
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Snippet Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for school or higher education assignment, or for entry-level labour markets. In this paper we...
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SubjectTerms Computer simulation
Education
Inapproximability
Incentives
Lists
Markets
Matching
NP-completeness
Polynomial-time algorithm
Serial dictatorship
Stability
Stable matchings
Teachers
Title Stable matchings of teachers to schools
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