Board Gender Diversity Codes, Quotas and Threats of Supranational Legislation: Impact on Director Characteristics and Corporate Outcomes
We explore how a code, soft quota and a proposal for supranational law for board gender diversity affects women directors’ human capital characteristics and corporate outcomes with an unbalanced panel of 116 non‐financial firms and 1,321 firm‐year observations from 2003 to 2016 in Spain. Consistent...
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| Published in: | British journal of management Vol. 33; no. 2; pp. 753 - 783 |
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| Main Authors: | , , |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
London
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
01.04.2022
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| Subjects: | |
| ISSN: | 1045-3172, 1467-8551 |
| Online Access: | Get full text |
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| Summary: | We explore how a code, soft quota and a proposal for supranational law for board gender diversity affects women directors’ human capital characteristics and corporate outcomes with an unbalanced panel of 116 non‐financial firms and 1,321 firm‐year observations from 2003 to 2016 in Spain. Consistent with resource dependence theory, after a non‐punitive law is passed, boards seek to appoint more female directors who possess human capital attributes that will reduce uncertainty and bring necessary resources to firms. Compared with their pre‐law counterparts, the new female directors tend to have more human capital in terms of executive experience in non‐listed firms, and some non‐executive backgrounds, education and international experience; however, these new women directors generally possess less human capital than their male counterparts. Upper echelons theory suggests that board directors can meaningfully impact corporate outcomes. Overall, our results contradict upper echelons predictions about the impact of a regulation‐driven increase of women directors on corporate outcomes. Indeed, we find a lack of impact of the increase in women's presence on boards on corporate outcomes. Regarding policy, our findings substantially differ from those reported for countries with ‘hard law’ board gender quotas. |
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| Bibliography: | The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the CNMV. The authors do not have any conflict of interest. The authors acknowledge comments received at the 2018 European Academy of Management (EURAM) Annual Conference, the XXVI Finance Forum and the 2018 Spanish Scientific Association for Business Economics and Management (ACEDE). We are grateful for support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness, Secretariat for Research, Development and Innovation, Project ECO2015‐69058‐R. Irma Martínez García acknowledges Eudald Canadell for inviting her to present the paper at the Seminar Programme of the Department of Research and Statistics of CNMV, the grants from the Ministry of Education's Faculty Training Programme (FPU14/04758 and EST17/00542) and the American University Center of Innovation for her visiting stay. We would particularly like to acknowledge the suggestions and comments of the editor, the associate editor and the three reviewers. ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 14 |
| ISSN: | 1045-3172 1467-8551 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/1467-8551.12517 |