Electoral Reform and Trade-Offs in Representation

We examine the effect of electoral institutions on two important features of representation that are often studied separately: policy responsiveness and the quality of legislators. Theoretically, we show that while a proportional electoral system is better than a majoritarian one at representing pop...

Celý popis

Uložené v:

Podrobná bibliografia
Vydané v:	The American political science review Ročník 113; číslo 3; s. 694 - 709
Hlavní autori:	BECHER, MICHAEL, GONZÁLEZ, IRENE MENÉNDEZ
Médium:	Journal Article
Jazyk:	English
Vydavateľské údaje:	New York, USA Cambridge University Press 01.08.2019
Predmet:	20th century Accountability British history Candidates Case Studies Congruence Control Groups Debates Disproportionate Representation Elections Electoral reform Electoral systems Financial Policy Governance Ideology Legislators Legislatures Members of Parliament Minority Groups Organizational Change Parliaments Participative Decision Making Political representation Political science Politicians Politics Proportional representation Reforms Representation Research Design Responsiveness Scientific Concepts Voter behavior Voters
ISSN:	0003-0554, 1537-5943
On-line prístup:	Získať plný text
Tagy:	Pridať tag Žiadne tagy, Buďte prvý, kto otaguje tento záznam!

Popis
Shrnutí:	We examine the effect of electoral institutions on two important features of representation that are often studied separately: policy responsiveness and the quality of legislators. Theoretically, we show that while a proportional electoral system is better than a majoritarian one at representing popular preferences in some contexts, this advantage can come at the price of undermining the selection of good politicians. To empirically assess the relevance of this trade-off, we analyze an unusually controlled electoral reform in Switzerland early in the twentieth century. To account for endogeneity, we exploit variation in the intensive margin of the reform, which introduced proportional representation, based on administrative constraints and data on voter preferences. A difference-in-difference analysis finds that higher reform intensity increases the policy congruence between legislators and the electorate and reduces legislative effort. Contemporary evidence from the European Parliament supports this conclusion.
Bibliografia:	ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 14
ISSN:	0003-0554 1537-5943
DOI:	10.1017/S0003055419000145