Persuasion with limited communication capacity

We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision maker communicate through an imperfect channel that has a fixed and limited number of messages and is subject to exogenous noise. We provide an upper bound on the payoffs the persuader can secure by communicating through...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Journal of economic theory Vol. 184; p. 104940
Main Authors:	Le Treust, Maël, Tomala, Tristan
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	Elsevier Inc 01.11.2019 Elsevier
Subjects:	Bayesian persuasion Communication channel Computer Science Computer Science and Game Theory Humanities and Social Sciences Information Theory Library and information sciences Mutual information Bayesian persuasion Communication channel D83 Mutual information C72 D82 communication channel mutual information
ISSN:	0022-0531, 1095-7235
Online Access:	Get full text
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