Persuasion with limited communication capacity
We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision maker communicate through an imperfect channel that has a fixed and limited number of messages and is subject to exogenous noise. We provide an upper bound on the payoffs the persuader can secure by communicating through...
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| Published in: | Journal of economic theory Vol. 184; p. 104940 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
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Elsevier Inc
01.11.2019
Elsevier |
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| ISSN: | 0022-0531, 1095-7235 |
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| Abstract | We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision maker communicate through an imperfect channel that has a fixed and limited number of messages and is subject to exogenous noise. We provide an upper bound on the payoffs the persuader can secure by communicating through the channel. We also show that the bound is tight, i.e., if the persuasion problem consists of a large number of independent copies of the same base problem, then the persuader can achieve this bound arbitrarily closely by using strategies that tie all the problems together. We characterize this optimal payoff as a function of the information-theoretic capacity of the communication channel. |
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| AbstractList | We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision maker communicate through an imperfect channel which has a fixed and limited number of messages and is subject to exogenous noise. Imperfect communication entails a loss of payoff for the persuader. We establish an upper bound on the payoffs the persuader can secure by communicating through the channel. We also show that the bound is tight: if the persuasion problem consists of a large number of independent copies of the same base problem, then the persuader can achieve this bound arbitrarily closely by using strategies which tie all the problems together. We characterize this optimal payoff as a function of the information-theoretic capacity of the communication channel. We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision maker communicate through an imperfect channel that has a fixed and limited number of messages and is subject to exogenous noise. We provide an upper bound on the payoffs the persuader can secure by communicating through the channel. We also show that the bound is tight, i.e., if the persuasion problem consists of a large number of independent copies of the same base problem, then the persuader can achieve this bound arbitrarily closely by using strategies that tie all the problems together. We characterize this optimal payoff as a function of the information-theoretic capacity of the communication channel. |
| ArticleNumber | 104940 |
| Author | Tomala, Tristan Le Treust, Maël |
| Author_xml | – sequence: 1 givenname: Maël surname: Le Treust fullname: Le Treust, Maël email: mael.le-treust@ensea.fr organization: ETIS UMR 8051, Université Paris Seine, Université Cergy-Pontoise, ENSEA, CNRS, F-95000, Cergy, France – sequence: 2 givenname: Tristan surname: Tomala fullname: Tomala, Tristan email: tomala@hec.fr organization: HEC Paris and GREGHEC, 1 rue de la Libération, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France |
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| Keywords | Bayesian persuasion Communication channel D83 Mutual information C72 D82 communication channel mutual information |
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| Snippet | We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision maker communicate through an imperfect channel that has a fixed and limited... We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision maker communicate through an imperfect channel which has a fixed and limited... |
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| SubjectTerms | Bayesian persuasion Communication channel Computer Science Computer Science and Game Theory Humanities and Social Sciences Information Theory Library and information sciences Mutual information |
| Title | Persuasion with limited communication capacity |
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