SSPFA: effective stack smashing protection for Android OS

In this paper, we detail why the stack smashing protector (SSP), one of the most effective techniques to mitigate stack buffer overflow attacks, fails to protect the Android operating system and thus causes a false sense of security that affects all Android devices. We detail weaknesses of existing...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:International journal of information security Jg. 18; H. 4; S. 519 - 532
Hauptverfasser: Marco-Gisbert, Héctor, Ripoll-Ripoll, Ismael
Format: Journal Article
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Berlin/Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 01.08.2019
Springer Nature B.V
Schlagworte:
ISSN:1615-5262, 1615-5270
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:In this paper, we detail why the stack smashing protector (SSP), one of the most effective techniques to mitigate stack buffer overflow attacks, fails to protect the Android operating system and thus causes a false sense of security that affects all Android devices. We detail weaknesses of existing SSP implementations, revealing that current SSP is not secure. We propose SSPFA, the first effective and practical SSP for Android devices. SSPFA provides security against stack buffer overflows without changing the underlying architecture. SSPFA has been implemented and tested on several real devices showing that it is not intrusive, and it is binary-compatible with Android applications. Extensive empirical validation has been carried out over the proposed solution.
Bibliographie:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 14
ISSN:1615-5262
1615-5270
DOI:10.1007/s10207-018-00425-8