Stability based on single-agent deviations in additively separable hedonic games

Coalition formation is a central concern in multiagent systems. A common desideratum for coalition structures is stability, defined by the absence of beneficial deviations of single agents. Such deviations require an agent to improve her utility by joining another coalition. On top of that, the feas...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Artificial intelligence Jg. 334; S. 104160
Hauptverfasser:	Brandt, Felix, Bullinger, Martin, Tappe, Leo
Format:	Journal Article
Sprache:	Englisch
Veröffentlicht:	Elsevier B.V 01.09.2024
Schlagworte:	Algorithmic game theory Computational complexity Computational social choice Dynamics Hedonic games Single-agent stability Single-agent stability Computational social choice Dynamics Algorithmic game theory Computational complexity Hedonic games
ISSN:	0004-3702, 1872-7921
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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