Language-based information-flow security
Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the end-to-end behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker throug...
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| Published in: | IEEE journal on selected areas in communications Vol. 21; no. 1; pp. 5 - 19 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
New York
IEEE
01.01.2003
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) |
| Subjects: | |
| ISSN: | 0733-8716, 1558-0008 |
| Online Access: | Get full text |
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| Summary: | Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the end-to-end behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker through the attacker's observations of system output; this policy regulates information flow. Conventional security mechanisms such as access control and encryption do not directly address the enforcement of information-flow policies. Previously, a promising new approach has been developed: the use of programming-language techniques for specifying and enforcing information-flow policies. In this paper, we survey the past three decades of research on information-flow security, particularly focusing on work that uses static program analysis to enforce information-flow policies. We give a structured view of work in the area and identify some important open challenges. |
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| Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 14 content type line 23 |
| ISSN: | 0733-8716 1558-0008 |
| DOI: | 10.1109/JSAC.2002.806121 |