Language-based information-flow security

Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the end-to-end behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker throug...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE journal on selected areas in communications Vol. 21; no. 1; pp. 5 - 19
Main Authors: Sabelfeld, A., Myers, A.C.
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: New York IEEE 01.01.2003
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
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ISSN:0733-8716, 1558-0008
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the end-to-end behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker through the attacker's observations of system output; this policy regulates information flow. Conventional security mechanisms such as access control and encryption do not directly address the enforcement of information-flow policies. Previously, a promising new approach has been developed: the use of programming-language techniques for specifying and enforcing information-flow policies. In this paper, we survey the past three decades of research on information-flow security, particularly focusing on work that uses static program analysis to enforce information-flow policies. We give a structured view of work in the area and identify some important open challenges.
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ISSN:0733-8716
1558-0008
DOI:10.1109/JSAC.2002.806121