Secure Bit: Transparent, Hardware Buffer-Overflow Protection

We propose a minimalist, architectural approach, Secure Bit (patent pending), to protect against buffer overflow attacks on control data (return-address and function-pointer attacks in particular). Secure Bit provides a hardware bit to protect the integrity of addresses for the purpose of preventing...

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Veröffentlicht in:IEEE transactions on dependable and secure computing Jg. 3; H. 4; S. 365 - 376
Hauptverfasser: Piromsopa, K., Enbody, R.J.
Format: Journal Article
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Washington IEEE 01.10.2006
IEEE Computer Society
Schlagworte:
Application software
Buffer overflow
Buffers
Computer programs
Costs
Cybersecurity
Data integrity
Hardware
invasive software
Kernel
Legacy
Linux
Metadata
Prevention
Protection
Protocols
Robustness
Runtime
security and protection
security kernels
Software
Software packages
Studies
UNIX (operating system)
Windows (computer programs)
United States > US
ISSN:1545-5971, 1941-0018
Online-Zugang:Volltext
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Zusammenfassung:We propose a minimalist, architectural approach, Secure Bit (patent pending), to protect against buffer overflow attacks on control data (return-address and function-pointer attacks in particular). Secure Bit provides a hardware bit to protect the integrity of addresses for the purpose of preventing such buffer-overflow attacks. Secure Bit is transparent to user software: it provides backward compatibility with legacy user code. It can detect and prevent all address-corrupting buffer-overflow attacks with little runtime performance penalty. Addresses passed in buffers between processes are marked insecure, and control instructions using those addresses as targets will raise an exception. An important differentiating aspect of our protocol is that, once an address has been marked as insecure, there is no instruction to remark it as secure. Robustness and transparency are demonstrated by emulating the hardware, booting Linux on the emulator, running application software on that Linux, and performing known attacks
Bibliographie:SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
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ISSN:1545-5971
1941-0018
DOI:10.1109/TDSC.2006.56