Subgame-perfect Equilibria in Mean-payoff Games (journal version)

In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the notion of negotiation function. We establish that the plays that...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Logical methods in computer science Vol. 19, Issue 4
Main Authors:	Brice, Léonard, Bogaard, Marie van den, Raskin, Jean-François
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	Logical Methods in Computer Science Association 25.10.2023 Logical Methods in Computer Science e.V
Subjects:	Computer Science computer science - computer science and game theory Computer Science and Game Theory
ISSN:	1860-5974, 1860-5974
Online Access:	Get full text
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Summary:	In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the notion of negotiation function. We establish that the plays that are supported by SPEs are exactly those that are consistent with a fixed point of the negotiation function. Finally, we use that characterization to prove that the SPE threshold problem, who status was left open in the literature, is decidable.
ISSN:	1860-5974 1860-5974
DOI:	10.46298/lmcs-19(4:6)2023