Subgame-perfect Equilibria in Mean-payoff Games (journal version)
In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the notion of negotiation function. We establish that the plays that...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Logical methods in computer science Jg. 19, Issue 4 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Logical Methods in Computer Science Association
25.10.2023
Logical Methods in Computer Science e.V |
| Schlagworte: | |
| ISSN: | 1860-5974, 1860-5974 |
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| Abstract | In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the
subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs
with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of
requirement, and the notion of negotiation function. We establish that the
plays that are supported by SPEs are exactly those that are consistent with a
fixed point of the negotiation function. Finally, we use that characterization
to prove that the SPE threshold problem, who status was left open in the
literature, is decidable. |
|---|---|
| AbstractList | In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the
subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs
with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of
requirement, and the notion of negotiation function. We establish that the
plays that are supported by SPEs are exactly those that are consistent with a
fixed point of the negotiation function. Finally, we use that characterization
to prove that the SPE threshold problem, who status was left open in the
literature, is decidable. In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the notion of negotiation function. We establish that the plays that are supported by SPEs are exactly those that are consistent with a fixed point of the negotiation function. Finally, we use that characterization to prove that the SPE threshold problem, who status was left open in the literature, is decidable. |
| Author | Raskin, Jean-François Brice, Léonard Bogaard, Marie van den |
| Author_xml | – sequence: 1 givenname: Léonard surname: Brice fullname: Brice, Léonard – sequence: 2 givenname: Marie van den surname: Bogaard fullname: Bogaard, Marie van den – sequence: 3 givenname: Jean-François surname: Raskin fullname: Raskin, Jean-François |
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| Snippet | In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the
subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs
with... In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with... |
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| Title | Subgame-perfect Equilibria in Mean-payoff Games (journal version) |
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