Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: The single-crossing case

We consider games in which an informed sender first talks at no cost to a receiver; then, the latter proposes a decision and, finally, the sender accepts the proposal or “exits”. We make the following assumptions: the sender has finitely many types, the receiver's decision is real-valued, utili...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	Games and economic behavior Jg. 134; S. 242 - 263
Hauptverfasser:	Sémirat, Stéphan, Forges, Françoise
Format:	Journal Article Paper
Sprache:	Englisch
Veröffentlicht:	St. Louis Elsevier Inc 01.07.2022 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Elsevier
Schlagworte:	Discrete cheap talk Economics and Finance Humanities and Social Sciences Participation constraints Quantitative Finance Single-crossing Single-crossing Discrete cheap talk Participation constraints C72 D82 Discrete Cheap talk
ISSN:	0899-8256, 1090-2473
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!