Sémirat, S., & Forges, F. (2022). Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: The single-crossing case. Games and economic behavior, 134, 242-263. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.004
Chicago Style (17th ed.) CitationSémirat, Stéphan, and Françoise Forges. "Strategic Information Transmission with Sender's Approval: The Single-crossing Case." Games and Economic Behavior 134 (2022): 242-263. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.004.
MLA (9th ed.) CitationSémirat, Stéphan, and Françoise Forges. "Strategic Information Transmission with Sender's Approval: The Single-crossing Case." Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 134, 2022, pp. 242-263, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.004.
Warning: These citations may not always be 100% accurate.