Force, content and the varieties of subject

This paper argues that to account for group speech acts, we should adopt a representationalist account of mode / force. Individual and collective subjects do not only represent what they e.g. assert or order. By asserting or ordering they also indicate their theoretical or practical positions toward...

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Veröffentlicht in:Language & communication Jg. 69; S. 115 - 129
1. Verfasser: Schmitz, Michael
Format: Journal Article
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Oxford Elsevier Ltd 01.11.2019
Pergamon Press Inc
Schlagworte:
Collective intentionality
Group speech acts
Illocutionary force
Intentional content
Joint commitment
Person
Pragmatics
Propositions
Speech
Speech acts
Group speech acts
Illocutionary force
Joint commitment
Intentional content
Collective intentionality
Propositions
ISSN:0271-5309, 1873-3395
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Zusammenfassung:This paper argues that to account for group speech acts, we should adopt a representationalist account of mode / force. Individual and collective subjects do not only represent what they e.g. assert or order. By asserting or ordering they also indicate their theoretical or practical positions towards what they assert or order. The ‘Frege point’ cannot establish the received dichotomy of force and propositional content. On the contrary, only the representationalist account allows a satisfactory response to it. It also allows us to give a more satisfactory analysis of the speech act of inviting a joint commitment and to answer two important questions Bernhard Schmid has raised about group speech acts, namely whether there are 1st person plural forms of Moore’s paradox and of 1st person authority.
Bibliographie:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
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content type line 14
ISSN:0271-5309
1873-3395
DOI:10.1016/j.langcom.2019.10.001