The Varieties of Prudence

We sometimes face personal choices that are so momentous they appear to give rise to an intrapersonal analogue to the non-identity problem. Where the non-identity problem presents as a problem for morality, the intrapersonal analogue presents as a problem for prudence. The analogy has been explored...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Australasian journal of philosophy Vol. 102; no. 4; pp. 828 - 841
Main Author: Gubler, Simone
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Oxford Routledge 01.10.2024
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Subjects:
non-identity
prudence
transformative choice
well-being
ISSN:0004-8402, 1471-6828
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:We sometimes face personal choices that are so momentous they appear to give rise to an intrapersonal analogue to the non-identity problem. Where the non-identity problem presents as a problem for morality, the intrapersonal analogue presents as a problem for prudence. The analogy has been explored recently by Das and Paul, and although, as this paper argues, their analysis fails-there is no intrapersonal analogue for the non-identity problem-it functions to highlight a persistent and perplexing puzzle for prudential rationality. This paper offers its own explanation: namely, that the phenomena that motivate the purported intrapersonal problem are better accounted for by conceiving prudence as disjunctive. To this end, I sketch a theory of two varieties of prudence.
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content type line 14
ISSN:0004-8402
1471-6828
DOI:10.1080/00048402.2024.2338365