The Varieties of Prudence
We sometimes face personal choices that are so momentous they appear to give rise to an intrapersonal analogue to the non-identity problem. Where the non-identity problem presents as a problem for morality, the intrapersonal analogue presents as a problem for prudence. The analogy has been explored...
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| Vydáno v: | Australasian journal of philosophy Ročník 102; číslo 4; s. 828 - 841 |
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| Hlavní autor: | |
| Médium: | Journal Article |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Vydáno: |
Oxford
Routledge
01.10.2024
Taylor & Francis Ltd |
| Témata: | |
| ISSN: | 0004-8402, 1471-6828 |
| On-line přístup: | Získat plný text |
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| Shrnutí: | We sometimes face personal choices that are so momentous they appear to give rise to an intrapersonal analogue to the non-identity problem. Where the non-identity problem presents as a problem for morality, the intrapersonal analogue presents as a problem for prudence. The analogy has been explored recently by Das and Paul, and although, as this paper argues, their analysis fails-there is no intrapersonal analogue for the non-identity problem-it functions to highlight a persistent and perplexing puzzle for prudential rationality. This paper offers its own explanation: namely, that the phenomena that motivate the purported intrapersonal problem are better accounted for by conceiving prudence as disjunctive. To this end, I sketch a theory of two varieties of prudence. |
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| Bibliografie: | ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 14 |
| ISSN: | 0004-8402 1471-6828 |
| DOI: | 10.1080/00048402.2024.2338365 |