Novel Techniques for High-Sensitivity Hardware Trojan Detection Using Thermal and Power Maps

Hardware Trojans are malicious alterations or injections of unwanted circuitry to integrated circuits (ICs) by untrustworthy factories. They render great threat to the security of modern ICs by various unwanted activities such as bypassing or disabling the security fence of a system, leaking confide...

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Vydané v:IEEE transactions on computer-aided design of integrated circuits and systems Ročník 33; číslo 12; s. 1792 - 1805
Hlavní autori: Nowroz, Abdullah Nazma, Kangqiao Hu, Koushanfar, Farinaz, Reda, Sherief
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:English
Vydavateľské údaje: New York IEEE 01.12.2014
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Predmet:
Chips
Clustering methods
CMOS process
Computer information security
Hardware
Integrated circuits
Intrusion detection
Nanostructure
Principal component analysis
Principal components analysis
Run time (computers)
Trojan horses
thermal and power mapping
hardware Trojan detection
unsupervised clustering
2-D principal component analysis (2-DPCA)
ISSN:0278-0070, 1937-4151
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Popis
Shrnutí:Hardware Trojans are malicious alterations or injections of unwanted circuitry to integrated circuits (ICs) by untrustworthy factories. They render great threat to the security of modern ICs by various unwanted activities such as bypassing or disabling the security fence of a system, leaking confidential information, deranging, or destroying the entire chip. Traditional testing strategies are becoming ineffective since these techniques suffer from decreased sensitivity toward small Trojans because of oversized chip and large amount of process variation present in nanometer technologies. The production volume along with decreased controllability and observability to complex ICs internals make it difficult to efficiently perform Trojan detection using typical structural tests like path latency and leakage power. In this paper, we propose a completely new post-silicon multimodal approach using runtime thermal and power maps for Trojan detection and localization. Utilizing the novel framework, we propose two different Trojan detection methods involving 2-D principal component analysis. First, supervised thresholding in case training data set is available and second, unsupervised clustering which require no prior characterization data of the chip. We introduce 11 regularization in the thermal to power inversion procedure which improves Trojan detection accuracy. To characterize ICs accurately, we perform our experiments in presence of realistic CMOS process variation. Our experimental evaluations reveal that our proposed methodology can detect very small Trojans with 3-4 orders of magnitude smaller power consumptions than the total power usage of the chip, while it scales very well because of the spatial view to ICs internals by the thermal mapping.
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ISSN:0278-0070
1937-4151
DOI:10.1109/TCAD.2014.2354293