Price of anarchy and an approximation algorithm for the binary-preference capacitated selfish replication game

We consider the capacitated selfish replication (CSR) game with binary preferences, over general undirected networks. We study the price of anarchy of such games, and show that it is bounded above by 3. We develop a quasi-polynomial algorithm O(n2+lnD), where n is the number of players and D is the...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Automatica (Oxford) Vol. 76; pp. 153 - 163
Main Authors:	Etesami, Seyed Rasoul, Başar, Tamer
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	Elsevier Ltd 01.02.2017
Subjects:	Capacitated selfish replication game Optimal allocation Potential function Price of anarchy Pure Nash equilibrium (NE) Quasi-polynomial algorithm Capacitated selfish replication game Quasi-polynomial algorithm Potential function Optimal allocation Pure Nash equilibrium (NE) Price of anarchy
ISSN:	0005-1098, 1873-2836
Online Access:	Get full text
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