On coalitional manipulation for multiwinner elections: shortlisting

Shortlisting of candidates—selecting a group of “best” candidates—is a special case of multiwinner elections. We provide the first in-depth study of the computational complexity of strategic voting for shortlisting based on the perhaps most basic voting rule in this scenario, ℓ -Bloc (every voter ap...

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Vydáno v:Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems Ročník 35; číslo 2
Hlavní autoři: Bredereck, Robert, Kaczmarczyk, Andrzej, Niedermeier, Rolf
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: New York Springer US 01.10.2021
Springer Nature B.V
Témata:
Artificial Intelligence
Complexity
Computer Science
Computer Systems Organization and Communication Networks
Egalitarianism
Elections
Software Engineering/Programming and Operating Systems
User Interfaces and Human Computer Interaction
Voting
Bloc
Computational social choice
Tie-breaking
Utility aggregation
Strategic voting
Parameterized computational complexity
SNTV
ISSN:1387-2532, 1573-7454
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Shrnutí:Shortlisting of candidates—selecting a group of “best” candidates—is a special case of multiwinner elections. We provide the first in-depth study of the computational complexity of strategic voting for shortlisting based on the perhaps most basic voting rule in this scenario, ℓ -Bloc (every voter approves ℓ  candidates). In particular, we investigate the influence of several different group evaluation functions (e.g., egalitarian versus utilitarian) and tie-breaking mechanisms modeling pessimistic and optimistic manipulators. Among other things, we conclude that in an egalitarian setting strategic voting may indeed be computationally intractable regardless of the tie-breaking rule. Altogether, we provide a fairly comprehensive picture of the computational complexity landscape of this scenario.
Bibliografie:ObjectType-Article-1
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ISSN:1387-2532
1573-7454
DOI:10.1007/s10458-021-09507-9