On coalitional manipulation for multiwinner elections: shortlisting
Shortlisting of candidates—selecting a group of “best” candidates—is a special case of multiwinner elections. We provide the first in-depth study of the computational complexity of strategic voting for shortlisting based on the perhaps most basic voting rule in this scenario, ℓ -Bloc (every voter ap...
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| Vydáno v: | Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems Ročník 35; číslo 2 |
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01.10.2021
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| Abstract | Shortlisting of candidates—selecting a group of “best” candidates—is a special case of multiwinner elections. We provide the first in-depth study of the computational complexity of strategic voting for shortlisting based on the perhaps most basic voting rule in this scenario,
ℓ
-Bloc (every voter approves
ℓ
candidates). In particular, we investigate the influence of several different group evaluation functions (e.g., egalitarian versus utilitarian) and tie-breaking mechanisms modeling pessimistic and optimistic manipulators. Among other things, we conclude that in an egalitarian setting strategic voting may indeed be computationally intractable regardless of the tie-breaking rule. Altogether, we provide a fairly comprehensive picture of the computational complexity landscape of this scenario. |
|---|---|
| AbstractList | Shortlisting of candidates—selecting a group of “best” candidates—is a special case of multiwinner elections. We provide the first in-depth study of the computational complexity of strategic voting for shortlisting based on the perhaps most basic voting rule in this scenario,
$$\ell $$
ℓ
-Bloc (every voter approves
$$\ell $$
ℓ
candidates). In particular, we investigate the influence of several different group evaluation functions (e.g., egalitarian versus utilitarian) and tie-breaking mechanisms modeling pessimistic and optimistic manipulators. Among other things, we conclude that in an egalitarian setting strategic voting may indeed be computationally intractable regardless of the tie-breaking rule. Altogether, we provide a fairly comprehensive picture of the computational complexity landscape of this scenario. Shortlisting of candidates—selecting a group of “best” candidates—is a special case of multiwinner elections. We provide the first in-depth study of the computational complexity of strategic voting for shortlisting based on the perhaps most basic voting rule in this scenario, ℓ-Bloc (every voter approves ℓ candidates). In particular, we investigate the influence of several different group evaluation functions (e.g., egalitarian versus utilitarian) and tie-breaking mechanisms modeling pessimistic and optimistic manipulators. Among other things, we conclude that in an egalitarian setting strategic voting may indeed be computationally intractable regardless of the tie-breaking rule. Altogether, we provide a fairly comprehensive picture of the computational complexity landscape of this scenario. Shortlisting of candidates—selecting a group of “best” candidates—is a special case of multiwinner elections. We provide the first in-depth study of the computational complexity of strategic voting for shortlisting based on the perhaps most basic voting rule in this scenario, ℓ -Bloc (every voter approves ℓ candidates). In particular, we investigate the influence of several different group evaluation functions (e.g., egalitarian versus utilitarian) and tie-breaking mechanisms modeling pessimistic and optimistic manipulators. Among other things, we conclude that in an egalitarian setting strategic voting may indeed be computationally intractable regardless of the tie-breaking rule. Altogether, we provide a fairly comprehensive picture of the computational complexity landscape of this scenario. |
| ArticleNumber | 38 |
| Author | Kaczmarczyk, Andrzej Bredereck, Robert Niedermeier, Rolf |
| Author_xml | – sequence: 1 givenname: Robert orcidid: 0000-0002-6303-6276 surname: Bredereck fullname: Bredereck, Robert email: robert.bredereck@hu-berlin.de organization: Institut für Informatik, Algorithm Engineering, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin – sequence: 2 givenname: Andrzej orcidid: 0000-0003-1401-0157 surname: Kaczmarczyk fullname: Kaczmarczyk, Andrzej organization: Faculty IV, Algorithmics and Computational Complexity, Technische Universität Berlin – sequence: 3 givenname: Rolf orcidid: 0000-0003-1703-1236 surname: Niedermeier fullname: Niedermeier, Rolf organization: Faculty IV, Algorithmics and Computational Complexity, Technische Universität Berlin |
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| Cites_doi | 10.1007/BF00295861 10.1007/BF00182574 10.1017/CBO9780511800481 10.24963/ijcai.2018/47 10.1609/aaai.v24i1.7615 10.1007/978-3-540-24777-7 10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.008 10.1007/s00355-007-0268-6 10.1016/j.jcss.2014.11.003 10.1007/978-3-319-21275-3 10.1287/moor.8.4.538 10.1023/A:1005082925477 10.1007/978-3-642-41575-3_20 10.1609/aaai.v30i1.10031 10.1007/978-1-4471-5559-1 10.1007/s00355-017-1026-z 10.2307/2938220 10.24963/ijcai.2017/13 10.1145/1236457.1236461 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198566076.001.0001 10.1016/j.artint.2014.07.005 10.1016/j.artint.2015.01.003 10.1007/s00355-016-1019-3 10.1007/978-3-642-41575-3_5 10.1613/jair.3896 10.1613/jair.2566 10.24963/ijcai.2017/123 10.2307/1957270 10.1016/j.tcs.2008.09.065 |
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| References_xml | – reference: CyganMFominFVKowalikLLokshtanovDMarxDPilipczukMPilipczukMSaurabhSParameterized algorithms2015BerlinSpringer10.1007/978-3-319-21275-3 – reference: ElkindERotheJRotheJCooperative game theory, chap 3Economics and computation: an introduction to algorithmic game theory, computational social choice, and fair division2015BerlinSpringer135193 – reference: DebordBAn axiomatic characterization of Borda’s k-choice functionSocial Choice and Welfare199294337343119511010.1007/BF00182574 – reference: Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Poland. (2019). Informations on the election of The Board of Research Excellence (in Polish). http://www.bip.nauka.gov.pl/g2/oryginal/2019_03/c435c5061f0aab7158eba2716553f240.pdf. Accessed July 30, 2019 – reference: Barrot, N., Gourvès, L., Lang, J., Monnot, J., & Ries, B. (2013). Possible winners in approval voting. In Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on algorithmic decision theory, ADT ’13 (pp. 57–70). – reference: Aziz, H., Gaspers, S., Gudmundsson, J., Mackenzie, S., Mattei, N., & Walsh, T. (2015). Computational aspects of multi-winner approval voting. In Proceedings of the 14th international conference on autonomous agents and multiagent systems, AAMAS ’15 (pp. 107–115). – reference: KlausBManloveDFRossiFAzizHSavaniRChalkiadakisGWooldridgeMBrandtFConitzerVEndrissULangJProcacciaADCoalitional formationHandbook of computational social choice2016CambridgeCambridge University Press331396chap 14–16, part 3 – reference: FellowsMRHermelinDRosamondFVialetteSOn the parameterized complexity of multiple-interval graph problemsTheoretical Computer Science200941015361248831110.1016/j.tcs.2008.09.065 – reference: Bredereck, R., Kaczmarczyk, A., & Niedermeier, R. (2017). On coalitional manipulation for multiwinner elections: Shortlisting. 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| Title | On coalitional manipulation for multiwinner elections: shortlisting |
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