Insiders, Outsiders, Skills, and Preferences for Social Protection: Evidence From a Survey Experiment in Argentina

Standard theories in comparative political economy predict that labor market insiders oppose redistribution to poorer, often informal, labor market outsiders. In contrast, I argue that not all insiders oppose redistribution to outsiders. Extending recent work emphasizing the importance of economic i...

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Veröffentlicht in:Comparative political studies Jg. 54; H. 14; S. 2581 - 2610
1. Verfasser: Menéndez González, Irene
Format: Journal Article
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Los Angeles, CA SAGE Publications 01.12.2021
SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC
Schlagworte:
Comparative politics
Experiments
Job insecurity
Labor market
Polarization
Political economy
Polls & surveys
Protection
Redistribution
Social policy
Social protection
Social skills
Welfare state
Argentina
Latin America
political economy
social welfare programs
ISSN:0010-4140, 1552-3829
Online-Zugang:Volltext
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Zusammenfassung:Standard theories in comparative political economy predict that labor market insiders oppose redistribution to poorer, often informal, labor market outsiders. In contrast, I argue that not all insiders oppose redistribution to outsiders. Extending recent work emphasizing the importance of economic insecurity for insiders, I argue that exposure to risk leads to greater polarization regarding preferences for non-contributory social policy between low- and high-skilled insiders. I test implications of this logic using a survey experiment from a nationally representative sample in Argentina and complement this with analysis of observational data for 16 Latin American countries. I find strong evidence of polarization regarding preferences over social protection among low- and high-skilled insiders. The experiment reveals that low (high)-skilled insiders primed about the risk of becoming outsiders become more supportive of transfers to outsiders (insiders). The article provides new micro-foundations for insider–outsider coalitions in support of social policy expansion in middle-income countries.
Bibliographie:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
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content type line 14
ISSN:0010-4140
1552-3829
DOI:10.1177/00104140211024304