Insiders, Outsiders, Skills, and Preferences for Social Protection: Evidence From a Survey Experiment in Argentina

Standard theories in comparative political economy predict that labor market insiders oppose redistribution to poorer, often informal, labor market outsiders. In contrast, I argue that not all insiders oppose redistribution to outsiders. Extending recent work emphasizing the importance of economic i...

Celý popis

Uložené v:

Podrobná bibliografia
Vydané v:	Comparative political studies Ročník 54; číslo 14; s. 2581 - 2610
Hlavný autor:	Menéndez González, Irene
Médium:	Journal Article
Jazyk:	English
Vydavateľské údaje:	Los Angeles, CA SAGE Publications 01.12.2021 SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC
Predmet:	Comparative politics Experiments Job insecurity Labor market Polarization Political economy Polls & surveys Protection Redistribution Social policy Social protection Social skills Welfare state Argentina Latin America political economy social welfare programs
ISSN:	0010-4140, 1552-3829
On-line prístup:	Získať plný text
Tagy:	Pridať tag Žiadne tagy, Buďte prvý, kto otaguje tento záznam!

Buďte prvý, kto okomentuje tento záznam!