Insiders, Outsiders, Skills, and Preferences for Social Protection: Evidence From a Survey Experiment in Argentina

Standard theories in comparative political economy predict that labor market insiders oppose redistribution to poorer, often informal, labor market outsiders. In contrast, I argue that not all insiders oppose redistribution to outsiders. Extending recent work emphasizing the importance of economic i...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Comparative political studies Jg. 54; H. 14; S. 2581 - 2610
1. Verfasser:	Menéndez González, Irene
Format:	Journal Article
Sprache:	Englisch
Veröffentlicht:	Los Angeles, CA SAGE Publications 01.12.2021 SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC
Schlagworte:	Comparative politics Experiments Job insecurity Labor market Polarization Political economy Polls & surveys Protection Redistribution Social policy Social protection Social skills Welfare state Argentina Latin America political economy social welfare programs
ISSN:	0010-4140, 1552-3829
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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