Tying in two‐sided markets with heterogeneous advertising revenues and negative pricing

We offer a theory of anticompetitive tying in two‐sided markets when below‐cost or negative pricing is possible. With the coexistence of two consumer groups (one regarding tying and tied goods as complementary and the other as independent), a tying‐good monopolist may face difficulties in extracting...

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Vydané v:Journal of economics & management strategy Ročník 32; číslo 4; s. 757 - 787
Hlavní autori: Hahn, Jong‐Hee, Kim, Sang‐Hyun, Yoon, So Hye
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:English
Vydavateľské údaje: Cambridge Wiley Subscription Services, Inc 01.10.2023
Predmet:
Advertisements
Advertising
Antitrust laws
Law enforcement
Markets
Monopolies
Profits
Revenue
Sales
Social welfare
ISSN:1058-6407, 1530-9134
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Abstract We offer a theory of anticompetitive tying in two‐sided markets when below‐cost or negative pricing is possible. With the coexistence of two consumer groups (one regarding tying and tied goods as complementary and the other as independent), a tying‐good monopolist may face difficulties in extracting rent under separate sales and wish to use tying to directly capture the large advertising revenue created in the complementary segment. We uncover two distinct mechanisms by which tying raises monopoly profits but reduces social welfare. Our theory of tying can be applied to real‐world antitrust law enforcement, such as the Google Android case.
AbstractList We offer a theory of anticompetitive tying in two‐sided markets when below‐cost or negative pricing is possible. With the coexistence of two consumer groups (one regarding tying and tied goods as complementary and the other as independent), a tying‐good monopolist may face difficulties in extracting rent under separate sales and wish to use tying to directly capture the large advertising revenue created in the complementary segment. We uncover two distinct mechanisms by which tying raises monopoly profits but reduces social welfare. Our theory of tying can be applied to real‐world antitrust law enforcement, such as the Google Android case.
Author Yoon, So Hye
Kim, Sang‐Hyun
Hahn, Jong‐Hee
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  givenname: So Hye
  surname: Yoon
  fullname: Yoon, So Hye
  organization: Department of Economics Princeton University Princeton New Jersey USA
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SubjectTerms Advertisements
Advertising
Antitrust laws
Law enforcement
Markets
Monopolies
Profits
Revenue
Sales
Social welfare
Title Tying in two‐sided markets with heterogeneous advertising revenues and negative pricing
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