The promise of foundational prudence: a response to our critics

Monteiro and Ruby respond to criticisms concerning their international relations (IR) theory and its relationship to the philosophy of science. They believe that a genuine post-foundational IR is possible only once we, as a discipline, recognize the inherent uncertainty of knowledge and the value of...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International theory Vol. 1; no. 3; pp. 499 - 512
Main Authors: Monteiro, Nuno P., Ruby, Keven G.
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Cambridge, UK Cambridge University Press 01.11.2009
Subjects:
Attitudes
Constructivism
Debates
International Relations
Knowledge
Philosophers
Philosophy
Philosophy of science
Political Science Research
Political Science Theories
Political theory
Pragmatism
Science
Symposium on ‘Who needs Philosophy of Science, anyway?’
Uncertainty
Validity
ISSN:1752-9719, 1752-9727
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:Monteiro and Ruby respond to criticisms concerning their international relations (IR) theory and its relationship to the philosophy of science. They believe that a genuine post-foundational IR is possible only once we, as a discipline, recognize the inherent uncertainty of knowledge and the value of multiple approaches in our common endeavor to study international politics. That is the promise of foundational prudence.
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ISSN:1752-9719
1752-9727
DOI:10.1017/S1752971909990236