A general model for multi-parameter weighted voting games A general model for multi-parameter weighted voting games

We introduce a new and general model for voting games with multiple weight vectors. Previously studied models are obtained as special cases of the new model. In comparison to earlier models, games have more compact representation in the new model. In particular, we show that a previously well known...

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Vydané v:International journal of game theory Ročník 54; číslo 1; s. 15
Hlavní autori: Bhattacherjee, Sanjay, Chakravarty, Satya R., Sarkar, Palash
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:English
Vydavateľské údaje: Berlin/Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 01.06.2025
Springer Nature B.V
Predmet:
Algorithms
Behavioral/Experimental Economics
Boolean
Computation
Dynamic programming
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Euclidean space
Game Theory
Games
Hyperplanes
Operations Research/Decision Theory
Original Paper
Social and Behav. Sciences
Stockholders
Voting power
Dynamic programming
Multi-parameter games
C71
Weighted majority voting game
Boolean formula
ISSN:0020-7276, 1432-1270
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Popis
Shrnutí:We introduce a new and general model for voting games with multiple weight vectors. Previously studied models are obtained as special cases of the new model. In comparison to earlier models, games have more compact representation in the new model. In particular, we show that a previously well known example of a game having dimension exponential in the number of players can be represented in the new model using only two weight vectors. Further, we identify a new sub-class of games, that we call hyperplane voting games, which are compactly expressible in the new model, but not necessarily so in the previous models. For games represented in the new model, we present dynamic programming algorithms for determining various quantities required for computing different voting power indices. Methods for computing the number of minimal winning coalitions under various restrictions were not previously known even for the earlier models.
Bibliografia:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 14
ISSN:0020-7276
1432-1270
DOI:10.1007/s00182-025-00940-8