A Few Queries Go a Long Way: Information-Distortion Tradeoffs in Matching

We consider the One-Sided Matching problem, where n agents have preferences over n items, and these preferences are induced by underlying cardinal valuation functions. The goal is to match every agent to a single item so as to maximize the social welfare. Most of the related literature, however, ass...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Journal of artificial intelligence research Vol. 74; p. 227
Main Authors: Amanatidis, Georgios, Birmpas, Georgios, Filos-Ratsikas, Aris, Voudouris, Alexandros A.
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: San Francisco AI Access Foundation 01.01.2022
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ISSN:1076-9757, 1076-9757, 1943-5037
Online Access:Get full text
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