The power of verification for one-parameter agents

We initiate the study of mechanisms with verification for one-parameter agents. We give an algorithmic characterization of such mechanisms and show that they are provably better than mechanisms without verification, i.e., those previously considered in the literature. These results are obtained for...

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Vydáno v:Journal of computer and system sciences Ročník 75; číslo 3; s. 190 - 211
Hlavní autoři: Auletta, Vincenzo, De Prisco, Roberto, Penna, Paolo, Persiano, Giuseppe
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: Elsevier Inc 01.05.2009
Témata:
Algorithmic game theory
Mechanism design
Theory of algorithms
Theory of algorithms
Algorithmic game theory
Mechanism design
ISSN:0022-0000, 1090-2724
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Shrnutí:We initiate the study of mechanisms with verification for one-parameter agents. We give an algorithmic characterization of such mechanisms and show that they are provably better than mechanisms without verification, i.e., those previously considered in the literature. These results are obtained for a number of optimization problems motivated by the Internet and recently studied in the algorithmic mechanism design literature. The characterization can be regarded as an alternative approach to existing techniques to design truthful mechanisms. The construction of such mechanisms reduces to the construction of an algorithm satisfying certain “monotonicity” conditions which, for the case of verification, are much less stringent. In other words, verification makes the construction easier and the algorithm more efficient (both computationally and in terms of approximability).
ISSN:0022-0000
1090-2724
DOI:10.1016/j.jcss.2008.10.001