The Algorithmic Leviathan: Arbitrariness, Fairness, and Opportunity in Algorithmic Decision-Making Systems
This article examines the complaint that arbitrary algorithmic decisions wrong those whom they affect. It makes three contributions. First, it provides an analysis of what arbitrariness means in this context. Second, it argues that arbitrariness is not of moral concern except when special circumstan...
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| Vydáno v: | Canadian journal of philosophy Ročník 52; číslo 1; s. 26 - 43 |
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| Hlavní autoři: | , |
| Médium: | Journal Article |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Vydáno: |
Edmonton
Cambridge University Press
01.01.2022
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| Témata: | |
| ISSN: | 0045-5091, 1911-0820 |
| On-line přístup: | Získat plný text |
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| Shrnutí: | This article examines the complaint that arbitrary algorithmic decisions wrong those whom they affect. It makes three contributions. First, it provides an analysis of what
arbitrariness
means in this context. Second, it argues that arbitrariness is not of moral concern except when special circumstances apply. However, when the same algorithm or different algorithms based on the same data are used in multiple contexts, a person may be arbitrarily excluded from a broad range of opportunities. The third contribution is to explain why this systemic exclusion is of moral concern and to offer a solution to address it. |
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| Bibliografie: | ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 14 |
| ISSN: | 0045-5091 1911-0820 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/can.2022.3 |