An Algorithm for Resilient Nash Equilibrium Seeking in the Partial Information Setting
Current research in distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in the partial information setting assumes that information is exchanged between agents that are "truthful". However, in general noncooperative games agents may consider sending misinformation to neighboring agents with the goal...
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| Vydáno v: | IEEE transactions on control of network systems Ročník 10; číslo 4; s. 1 - 10 |
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| Hlavní autoři: | , |
| Médium: | Journal Article |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
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Piscataway
IEEE
01.12.2023
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) |
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| ISSN: | 2325-5870, 2372-2533 |
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| Abstract | Current research in distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in the partial information setting assumes that information is exchanged between agents that are "truthful". However, in general noncooperative games agents may consider sending misinformation to neighboring agents with the goal of further reducing their cost. Additionally, communication networks are vulnerable to attacks from agents outside the game as well as communication failures. In this paper, we propose a distributed NE seeking algorithm that is robust against adversarial agents that transmit noise, random signals, constant singles, deceitful messages, as well as being resilient to external factors such as dropped communication, jammed signals, and man in the middle attacks. The core issue that makes the problem challenging is that agents have no means of verifying if the information they receive is correct, i.e. there is no "ground truth". To address this problem, we use an observation graph, that gives truthful action information, in conjunction with a communication graph, that gives (potentially incorrect) information. By filtering information obtained from these two graphs, we show that our algorithm is resilient against adversarial agents and converges to the Nash equilibrium. |
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| AbstractList | Current research in distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in the partial information setting assumes that information is exchanged between agents that are "truthful". However, in general noncooperative games agents may consider sending misinformation to neighboring agents with the goal of further reducing their cost. Additionally, communication networks are vulnerable to attacks from agents outside the game as well as communication failures. In this paper, we propose a distributed NE seeking algorithm that is robust against adversarial agents that transmit noise, random signals, constant singles, deceitful messages, as well as being resilient to external factors such as dropped communication, jammed signals, and man in the middle attacks. The core issue that makes the problem challenging is that agents have no means of verifying if the information they receive is correct, i.e. there is no "ground truth". To address this problem, we use an observation graph, that gives truthful action information, in conjunction with a communication graph, that gives (potentially incorrect) information. By filtering information obtained from these two graphs, we show that our algorithm is resilient against adversarial agents and converges to the Nash equilibrium. Current research in distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in the partial information setting assumes that information is exchanged between agents that are “truthful.” However, in general noncooperative games, agents may consider sending misinformation to neighboring agents with the goal of further reducing their cost. In addition, communication networks are vulnerable to attacks from agents outside the game as well as communication failures. In this article, we propose a distributed NE seeking algorithm that is robust against adversarial agents that transmit noise, random signals, constant singles, deceitful messages, as well as being resilient to external factors such as dropped communication, jammed signals, and man-in-the-middle attacks. The core issue that makes the problem challenging is that agents have no means of verifying if the information they receive is correct, i.e., there is no “ground truth.” To address this problem, we use an observation graph, which gives truthful action information, in conjunction with a communication graph, which gives (potentially incorrect) information. By filtering information obtained from these two graphs, we show that our algorithm is resilient against adversarial agents and converges to the NE. |
| Author | Gadjov, Dian Pavel, Lacra |
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| SubjectTerms | Algorithms Communication Communication networks Control systems Costs Distributed algorithms/Control Drones Game theory Games Indexes Nash equilibrium Network systems nonlinear systems optimization Random signals Reagents sensor networks |
| Title | An Algorithm for Resilient Nash Equilibrium Seeking in the Partial Information Setting |
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