Social Norm Incentives for Network Coding in Manets

The performance of mobile ad hoc network transmissions subject to disruption, loss, interference, and jamming can be significantly improved with the use of network coding (NC). However, NC requires extra work for forwarders, including additional bandwidth consumption due to transmitting overheads fo...

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Vydáno v:IEEE/ACM transactions on networking Ročník 25; číslo 3; s. 1761 - 1774
Hlavní autoři: Chuchu Wu, Gerla, Mario, van der Schaar, Mihaela
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: New York IEEE 01.06.2017
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Témata:
Ad hoc networks
Bandwidths
Coding
Design parameters
Disruption
Encoding
Game theory
Games
incentive design
Incentives
Jamming
Microprocessors
Mobile ad hoc networks
Mobile communication systems
Network coding
Packet transmission
Peer-to-peer computing
Pollution
Pollution detection
reputation scheme
Reputations
Social norms
Streaming media
Sustainability
Wireless networks
ISSN:1063-6692, 1558-2566
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Shrnutí:The performance of mobile ad hoc network transmissions subject to disruption, loss, interference, and jamming can be significantly improved with the use of network coding (NC). However, NC requires extra work for forwarders, including additional bandwidth consumption due to transmitting overheads for redundant NC packets and additional processing due to generating the NC packets. Selfish forwarders may prefer to simply forward packets without coding them to avoid such overhead. This is especially true when network coding must be protected from pollution attacks, which involves additional, often processor intensive, pollution detection procedures. To drive selfish nodes to cooperate and encode the packets, this paper introduces social norm-based incentives. The social norm consists of a social strategy and a reputation system with reward and punishment connected with node behavior. Packet coding and forwarding are modeled and formalized as a repeated NC forwarding game. The conditions for the sustainability (or compliance) of the social norm are identified, and a sustainable social norm that maximizes the social utility is designed via selecting the optimal design parameters, including the social strategy, reputation threshold, reputation update frequency, and the generation size of network coding. For this game, the impacts of packet loss rate and transmission patterns on performance are evaluated, and their impacts on the decision of selecting the optimal social norm are discussed. Finally, practical issues, including distributed reputation dissemination and the existence of altruistic and malicious users, are discussed.
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ISSN:1063-6692
1558-2566
DOI:10.1109/TNET.2017.2656059