A FDI Attack-Resilient Distributed Secondary Control Strategy for Islanded Microgrids

Distributed cooperative control has been used as a preferred secondary control strategy for maintaining frequency synchronization and voltage restoration in cyber-physical AC microgrids due to its flexibility, scalability and better computational performance. However, such a control system is suscep...

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Vydané v:IEEE transactions on smart grid Ročník 12; číslo 3; s. 1929 - 1938
Hlavní autori: Chen, Yulin, Qi, Donglian, Dong, Hangning, Li, Chaoyong, Li, Zhenming, Zhang, Jianliang
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:English
Vydavateľské údaje: Piscataway IEEE 01.05.2021
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Predmet:
AC microgrids
Actuators
Algorithms
attack-resilient control
Control algorithms
Control methods
Control systems
Control theory
Controllers
Cooperative control
Cybersecurity
Decentralized control
distributed control
Distributed generation
Frequency control
Frequency synchronization
Microgrids
secondary control
Sensors
Voltage control
ISSN:1949-3053, 1949-3061
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Shrnutí:Distributed cooperative control has been used as a preferred secondary control strategy for maintaining frequency synchronization and voltage restoration in cyber-physical AC microgrids due to its flexibility, scalability and better computational performance. However, such a control system is susceptible to potential cyber attacks, i.e., false data injection (FDI) attacks. To this end, this article introduces a hidden layer based attack-resilient distributed cooperative control algorithm to solve the problem of the secondary control of islanded microgrids under FDI attacks. In comparison to the existing attack-resilient distributed control methods, the proposed controller with sufficient large <inline-formula> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">\alpha </tex-math></inline-formula> can mitigate the adverse effects of time dependent FDI attacks on actuators, sensors and communication links of the control system, and is also robust to state dependent FDI attacks. Furthermore, the algorithm is applicable even when all DGs and communications are compromised. Finally, the efficiency of the proposed controller is evaluated for a test microgrid with 4 DGs under different types of attack.
Bibliografia:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 14
ISSN:1949-3053
1949-3061
DOI:10.1109/TSG.2020.3047949