Unconditionally Secure Computation Against Low-Complexity Leakage

We consider the problem of constructing leakage-resilient circuit compilers that are secure against global leakage functions with bounded output length. By global, we mean that the leakage can depend on all circuit wires and output a low-complexity function (represented as a multi-output Boolean cir...

Celý popis

Uloženo v:
Podrobná bibliografie
Vydáno v:Journal of cryptology Ročník 34; číslo 4
Hlavní autoři: Bogdanov, Andrej, Ishai, Yuval, Srinivasan, Akshayaram
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: New York Springer US 01.10.2021
Springer Nature B.V
Témata:
Boolean algebra
Circuit design
Coding and Information Theory
Combinatorics
Communications Engineering
Compilers
Complexity
Computational Mathematics and Numerical Analysis
Computer Science
Leakage
Networks
Private circuits
Probability Theory and Stochastic Processes
Statelessness
ISSN:0933-2790, 1432-1378
On-line přístup:Získat plný text
Tagy: Přidat tag
Žádné tagy, Buďte první, kdo vytvoří štítek k tomuto záznamu!
Popis
Shrnutí:We consider the problem of constructing leakage-resilient circuit compilers that are secure against global leakage functions with bounded output length. By global, we mean that the leakage can depend on all circuit wires and output a low-complexity function (represented as a multi-output Boolean circuit) applied on these wires. In this work, we design compilers both in the stateless (a.k.a. single-shot leakage) setting and the stateful (a.k.a. continuous leakage) setting that are unconditionally secure against AC 0 leakage and similar low-complexity classes. In the stateless case, we show that the original private circuits construction of Ishai, Sahai, and Wagner (Crypto 2003) is actually secure against AC 0 leakage. In the stateful case, we modify the construction of Rothblum (Crypto 2012), obtaining a simple construction with unconditional security. Prior works that designed leakage-resilient circuit compilers against AC 0 leakage had to rely either on secure hardware components (Faust et al., Eurocrypt 2010, Miles-Viola, STOC 2013) or on (unproven) complexity-theoretic assumptions (Rothblum, Crypto 2012).
Bibliografie:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 14
ISSN:0933-2790
1432-1378
DOI:10.1007/s00145-021-09402-2