Capacity Withholding Constrained by Operational Limits of Generation Under Financial Virtual Divestiture in a Day-Ahead Market

This paper develops an equilibrium-based model for ex ante analysis of capacity withholding under financial virtual divestiture in a day-ahead market, including one dominant producer and a number of small producers considered as a price-taking competitive fringe. We model the offering problem of the...

Celý popis

Uloženo v:
Podrobná bibliografie
Vydáno v:IEEE transactions on power systems Ročník 33; číslo 1; s. 771 - 780
Hlavní autoři: Ameri, Massoud, Rahimiyan, Morteza, Latify, Mohammad Amin
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: IEEE 01.01.2018
Témata:
Analytical models
Contracts
Electricity supply industry
Financial virtual divestiture
market power
Mathematical model
mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints
Optimization
Production
Regulators
ISSN:0885-8950, 1558-0679
On-line přístup:Získat plný text
Tagy: Přidat tag
Žádné tagy, Buďte první, kdo vytvoří štítek k tomuto záznamu!
Popis
Shrnutí:This paper develops an equilibrium-based model for ex ante analysis of capacity withholding under financial virtual divestiture in a day-ahead market, including one dominant producer and a number of small producers considered as a price-taking competitive fringe. We model the offering problem of the dominant producer as a bilevel optimization problem. In the upper-level problem, the dominant producer derives optimal strategy of physical capacity withholding restricted by operational limits of its own generating units and conditions stated in the financial virtual divestiture. In the lower-level problem, market operator clears the day-ahead market on an hourly basis. We recast the bilevel optimization problem as a mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints problem and convert it to a mixed integer linear programming problem. We show how the application of the financial virtual divestiture may mitigate market power in the day-ahead market, through a case study. The numerical results demonstrate that the dominant producer can exploit technological diversification of its own generating units to exercise market power, even in the presence of this market power mitigation policy.
ISSN:0885-8950
1558-0679
DOI:10.1109/TPWRS.2017.2696706