Approximation algorithm and mechanism design for bisubmodular welfare maximization problem

In a combinatorial auction, m indivisible items are sold to multiple buyers. This paper explores the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions with bisubmodular buyers. When buyers' valuations are public, we give a simple greedy algorithm that outputs an allocation achieving 2-appr...

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Vydané v:	Theoretical computer science Ročník 1046; s. 115302
Hlavní autori:	Wang, Yuanyuan, Nong, Qingqin, Liu, Wenjing, Fang, Qizhi
Médium:	Journal Article
Jazyk:	English
Vydavateľské údaje:	Elsevier B.V 28.08.2025
Predmet:	Approximation algorithm Bisubmodular Combinatorial auction Mechanism Welfare maximization Combinatorial auction Welfare maximization Bisubmodular Approximation algorithm Mechanism
ISSN:	0304-3975
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