Approximation algorithm and mechanism design for bisubmodular welfare maximization problem

In a combinatorial auction, m indivisible items are sold to multiple buyers. This paper explores the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions with bisubmodular buyers. When buyers' valuations are public, we give a simple greedy algorithm that outputs an allocation achieving 2-appr...

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Bibliographic Details

Published in:	Theoretical computer science Vol. 1046; p. 115302
Main Authors:	Wang, Yuanyuan, Nong, Qingqin, Liu, Wenjing, Fang, Qizhi
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	Elsevier B.V 28.08.2025
Subjects:	Approximation algorithm Bisubmodular Combinatorial auction Mechanism Welfare maximization Combinatorial auction Welfare maximization Bisubmodular Approximation algorithm Mechanism
ISSN:	0304-3975
Online Access:	Get full text
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