Approximation algorithm and mechanism design for bisubmodular welfare maximization problem

In a combinatorial auction, m indivisible items are sold to multiple buyers. This paper explores the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions with bisubmodular buyers. When buyers' valuations are public, we give a simple greedy algorithm that outputs an allocation achieving 2-appr...

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Veröffentlicht in:Theoretical computer science Jg. 1046; S. 115302
Hauptverfasser: Wang, Yuanyuan, Nong, Qingqin, Liu, Wenjing, Fang, Qizhi
Format: Journal Article
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Elsevier B.V 28.08.2025
Schlagworte:
Approximation algorithm
Bisubmodular
Combinatorial auction
Mechanism
Welfare maximization
Combinatorial auction
Welfare maximization
Bisubmodular
Approximation algorithm
Mechanism
ISSN:0304-3975
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Zusammenfassung:In a combinatorial auction, m indivisible items are sold to multiple buyers. This paper explores the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions with bisubmodular buyers. When buyers' valuations are public, we give a simple greedy algorithm that outputs an allocation achieving 2-approximation, and we prove a hardness result for the bisubmodular welfare maximization problem. When buyers are strategic individuals with valuations as private information, we give a dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) mechanism that can motivate buyers to provide truthful information and outputs an allocation achieving O(m)-approximation.
ISSN:0304-3975
DOI:10.1016/j.tcs.2025.115302