Approximation algorithm and mechanism design for bisubmodular welfare maximization problem
In a combinatorial auction, m indivisible items are sold to multiple buyers. This paper explores the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions with bisubmodular buyers. When buyers' valuations are public, we give a simple greedy algorithm that outputs an allocation achieving 2-appr...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Theoretical computer science Jg. 1046; S. 115302 |
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28.08.2025
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| Abstract | In a combinatorial auction, m indivisible items are sold to multiple buyers. This paper explores the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions with bisubmodular buyers. When buyers' valuations are public, we give a simple greedy algorithm that outputs an allocation achieving 2-approximation, and we prove a hardness result for the bisubmodular welfare maximization problem. When buyers are strategic individuals with valuations as private information, we give a dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) mechanism that can motivate buyers to provide truthful information and outputs an allocation achieving O(m)-approximation. |
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| AbstractList | In a combinatorial auction, m indivisible items are sold to multiple buyers. This paper explores the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions with bisubmodular buyers. When buyers' valuations are public, we give a simple greedy algorithm that outputs an allocation achieving 2-approximation, and we prove a hardness result for the bisubmodular welfare maximization problem. When buyers are strategic individuals with valuations as private information, we give a dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) mechanism that can motivate buyers to provide truthful information and outputs an allocation achieving O(m)-approximation. |
| ArticleNumber | 115302 |
| Author | Wang, Yuanyuan Fang, Qizhi Nong, Qingqin Liu, Wenjing |
| Author_xml | – sequence: 1 givenname: Yuanyuan surname: Wang fullname: Wang, Yuanyuan – sequence: 2 givenname: Qingqin orcidid: 0000-0002-0895-7793 surname: Nong fullname: Nong, Qingqin email: qqnong@ouc.edu.cn – sequence: 3 givenname: Wenjing surname: Liu fullname: Liu, Wenjing – sequence: 4 givenname: Qizhi surname: Fang fullname: Fang, Qizhi |
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| Cites_doi | 10.2307/3003463 10.1287/mnsc.44.8.1131 10.1007/s00453-007-9105-7 10.1016/j.jcss.2011.02.010 10.1287/moor.1090.0436 10.1145/502090.502098 10.1016/0012-365X(94)00246-F 10.1016/j.trb.2023.02.008 10.1145/3440959.3440964 10.1007/BF01589420 10.1007/BF02760037 10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.006 |
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| Keywords | Combinatorial auction Welfare maximization Bisubmodular Approximation algorithm Mechanism |
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| SubjectTerms | Approximation algorithm Bisubmodular Combinatorial auction Mechanism Welfare maximization |
| Title | Approximation algorithm and mechanism design for bisubmodular welfare maximization problem |
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