Automating approximation analysis for Nash equilibria algorithms in two-player games

Computing polynomial-time approximate Nash equilibria (NE) is a fundamental problem in algorithmic game theory, with deep connections to the complexity class TFNP. Recent advances in approximate NE algorithms have become increasingly sophisticated, making the verification of their approximation guar...

Celý popis

Uloženo v:
Podrobná bibliografie
Vydáno v:Information and computation Ročník 307; s. 105362
Hlavní autoři: Deng, Xiaotie, Li, Dongchen, Li, Hanyu
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: Elsevier Inc 01.11.2025
Témata:
Algorithmic game theory
Approximation algorithms
Automated algorithm analysis
Nash equilibrium
Verification
Nash equilibrium
Approximation algorithms
Automated algorithm analysis
Verification
Algorithmic game theory
ISSN:0890-5401
On-line přístup:Získat plný text
Tagy: Přidat tag
Žádné tagy, Buďte první, kdo vytvoří štítek k tomuto záznamu!
Popis
Shrnutí:Computing polynomial-time approximate Nash equilibria (NE) is a fundamental problem in algorithmic game theory, with deep connections to the complexity class TFNP. Recent advances in approximate NE algorithms have become increasingly sophisticated, making the verification of their approximation guarantees both complex and error-prone. We present the first automated method for analyzing approximation bounds of algorithms for two-player normal-form games. Given any algorithm that computes approximate NE, our approach automatically derives tight approximation bounds using constraint programming techniques. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method by applying it to all known algorithms in the literature, reproducing their manually-proven approximation bounds within seconds and without human intervention. Our results provide both a powerful verification tool and new insights into the structure of approximate equilibrium computation.
ISSN:0890-5401
DOI:10.1016/j.ic.2025.105362