Proportional Representation and Right-Wing Populism: Evidence from Electoral System Change in Europe

How much do electoral institutions matter for the rise of populist parties? Evidence on this question is mixed, with some scholars arguing that the role of electoral rules is small. We provide new evidence for the impact of electoral system change. The UK's adoption of a proportional electoral...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:British journal of political science Vol. 53; no. 1; pp. 261 - 268
Main Authors: Becher, Michael, Menéndez González, Irene, Stegmueller, Daniel
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Cambridge, UK Cambridge University Press 01.01.2023
Subjects:
Changes
Dominance
Elections
Electoral reform
Electoral systems
Euroscepticism
Globalization
Letter
Political science
Politics
Populism
Proportional representation
Reforms
Right wing politics
Unemployment
Voting
United Kingdom > UK
Europe
electoral rules
electoral reform
populism
European Union
synthetic control
ISSN:0007-1234, 1469-2112
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:How much do electoral institutions matter for the rise of populist parties? Evidence on this question is mixed, with some scholars arguing that the role of electoral rules is small. We provide new evidence for the impact of electoral system change. The UK's adoption of a proportional electoral system for European elections in 1999 provides a unique opportunity to study the link between electoral rules and the ascendancy of right-wing populist parties. Employing both synthetic control and difference-in-difference methods, we estimate that the electoral reform increased the vote share of right-wing populists by about 12 to 13.5 percentage points on average. During a time when populism was rising across Europe, the reform abruptly shifted populist votes in the UK above the European trend and above more plausible comparison cases. Our results also imply that caution is needed when empirical results based on partial reforms are extrapolated to electoral system change.
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ISSN:0007-1234
1469-2112
DOI:10.1017/S0007123421000703