Examining popular arguments against AI existential risk: a philosophical analysis

Concerns about artificial intelligence (AI) and its potential existential risks have garnered significant attention, with figures like Geoffrey Hinton and Dennis Hassabis advocating for robust safeguards against catastrophic outcomes. Prominent scholars, such as Nick Bostrom and Max Tegmark, have fu...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Ethics and information technology Vol. 28; no. 1; p. 7
Main Authors: Swoboda, Torben, Uuk, Risto, Lauwaert, Lode, Rebera, Andrew P., Oimann, Ann-Katrien, Chomanski, Bartlomiej, Prunkl, Carina
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01.03.2026
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects:
Academic discourse
Academic writing
Artificial intelligence
Computer Science
Criticism
Critics
Debates
Discourse
Distraction
Ethics
Frailty
Imbalance
Innovation/Technology Management
Library Science
Management of Computing and Information Systems
Mass media
Media coverage
Nobel prizes
Risk
Safeguards
User Interfaces and Human Computer Interaction
Existential risk
AI Safety
Artificial general intelligence
AI risk skepticism
Superintelligence
ISSN:1388-1957, 1572-8439
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:Concerns about artificial intelligence (AI) and its potential existential risks have garnered significant attention, with figures like Geoffrey Hinton and Dennis Hassabis advocating for robust safeguards against catastrophic outcomes. Prominent scholars, such as Nick Bostrom and Max Tegmark, have further advanced the discourse by exploring the long-term impacts of superintelligent AI. However, this existential risk narrative faces criticism, particularly in popular media, where scholars like Timnit Gebru, Melanie Mitchell, and Nick Clegg argue, among other things, that it distracts from pressing current issues. Despite extensive media coverage, skepticism toward the existential risk discourse has received limited rigorous treatment in academic literature. Addressing this imbalance, this paper reconstructs and evaluates three common arguments against the existential risk perspective: the Distraction Argument, the Argument from Human Frailty, and the Checkpoints for Intervention Argument. By systematically reconstructing and assessing these arguments, the paper aims to provide a foundation for more balanced academic discourse and further research on AI.
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ISSN:1388-1957
1572-8439
DOI:10.1007/s10676-025-09881-y