Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes Indonesia and Malaysia in Comparative Perspective
Why do some authoritarian regimes topple during financial crises, while others steer through financial crises relatively unscathed? In this book, Thomas B. Pepinsky uses the experiences of Indonesia and Malaysia and the analytical tools of open economy macroeconomics to answer this question. Focusin...
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| Format: | eBook Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
New York, N.Y
Cambridge University Press
17.08.2009
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| Edition: | 1 |
| Subjects: | |
| ISBN: | 0521744385, 9780521744386, 0521767938, 9780521767934 |
| Online Access: | Get full text |
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Table of Contents:
- Mild Crisis -- Mahathirism versus Anarchy -- The Party System -- Successful Adjustment -- Mahathir's Malaysia in 1997 -- From Economic to Political Crisis -- Anwar versus Mahathir -- Containing Domestic Opposition -- International Retreat and Domestic Offensive -- Capital Controls and Crackdown -- The 1999 General Elections -- Conclusion -- 8 Cross-National Perspectives -- Capital Account Restrictions and Regime Survival -- Debt Crises in the Southern Cone -- Chile, 1981-1985 -- Argentina, 1981-1983 -- Uruguay, 1981-1985 -- Mexico: 1980s and 1990s -- The Latin American Debt Crisis in Mexico -- From Orthodoxy to the Tequila Crisis to Authoritarian Breakdown -- Conclusion: Cross-National Perspectives on Crises, Coalitions, and Change -- 9 Conclusions -- Implications for Social Science -- Theories of Authoritarianism -- Open Economy Politics -- Authoritarian Breakdowns -- Normative Implications -- References -- Index
- Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- List of Tables -- List of Figures -- Acknowledgments -- Terms and Abbreviations -- 1 Crises, Adjustment, and Transitions -- Two Countries, Two Trajectories -- Understanding Adjustment and Authoritarian Breakdowns -- Data and Methods -- The Plan of the Book -- 2 Coalitional Sources of Adjustment and Regime Survival -- The Reform Game -- Financial Crises and the Problem of Adjustment -- Solutions -- Players and Policies -- Predictions -- The Global Scope of the Argument -- Conclusion -- Appendix -- 3 Authoritarian Support Coalitions: Comparing Indonesia and Malaysia -- The New Order -- Fixed Capital: ABRI and the Pribumi Entrepreneurs -- Mobile Capital: The Konglomerat -- Mahathir's Malaysia -- The Malay Masses -- Fixed Capital: New Malay Entrepreneurs -- Discussion: Alternative Models of Authoritarian Politics -- 4 Adjustment Policy in Indonesia, June 1997-May 1998 -- Crisis Onset -- Fiscal and Trade Policy -- Monetary Policy -- Finance and Corporate Policy -- Exchange Rate and Capital Account Policy -- Alternative Explanations? -- 5 Adjustment Policy in Malaysia, June 1997-December 1999 -- Crisis Onset -- Fiscal and Trade Policy -- Monetary Policy -- Finance and Corporate Policy -- Exchange Rate and Capital Account Policy -- Alternative Explanations? -- 6 Authoritarian Breakdown in Indonesia -- Ex Ante Unlikely, Ex Post Inevitable -- Legitimacy -- Massive Groundswell of Discontent -- Irrationality -- Structural Contradictions -- Coalitional Fracture -- Late New Order Politics -- From Economic to Political Crisis -- The Konglomerat and Chinese Indonesians -- Final Months of Regime Unity -- Riots, Exit, and Endgame -- Conclusion -- Postscript: From Authoritarian Breakdown to Democratization -- 7 Authoritarian Stability in Malaysia -- ''The Tragedy That Didn't Happen'