Mechanism Design A Linear Programming Approach

Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design base...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Vohra, Rakesh V.
Format: E-Book Buch
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: New York Cambridge University Press 09.05.2011
Cambridge Univ. Press
Ausgabe:1
Schriftenreihe:Econometric Society monographs
Schlagworte:
ISBN:9781107004368, 1107004365, 9780521179461, 0521179467
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Abstract Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design.
AbstractList "Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design"--
Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design. Summary reprinted by permission of Cambridge University Press
Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design.
Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming.
Author Vohra, Rakesh V.
Author_xml – sequence: 1
  givenname: Rakesh V.
  surname: Vohra
  fullname: Vohra, Rakesh V.
  organization: Northwestern University, Illinois
BackLink http://www.econis.eu/PPNSET?PPN=652963390$$DView this record in ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften
BookMark eNqNkUtLQzEQhSM-UGvBpTtdKS6qySSTx1LrE5RuxG3ITdN69fZGb6rivzd9gFgRnc1w4DtnmJlNslLHOhCyw-gRo0wdd097RmmKjGmOwOQSaX_Ty1PNGFWUCi71KtkEmiU1VMAa2VAc0QhgYp20U3qkuZBKzekG2b4N_sHVZRrtnYVUDustsjpwVQrteW-R-4vzu-5V56Z3ed09uek4NFxCp48DrvuCcdBQSI6KORAevJIDKdHkcAYOvS4cSA-Fp5gN3imBwQSOBW-Rg1nwcxNfXkMa21GZfKgqV4f4mqwBbTQCQiYPZ6RLT-E9PcRqnOxbFYoYnzI32ZwbKlEb8R-WKsUEcPk3-3XhzO7O2OBjvpZ9bsqRaz6sRDCS5_GZ2F_YZxrkQz1uXGXPT7vSMIOTKD4DvRsVTdkfButjM5_KqJ283C6-PLs6P1xF_J3_BBP2nsE
ContentType eBook
Book
Copyright Rakesh V. Vohra 2011
Copyright_xml – notice: Rakesh V. Vohra 2011
DBID OQ6
8BJ
FQK
JBE
DEWEY 658.4033
DOI 10.1017/CBO9780511835216
DatabaseName ECONIS
International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)
International Bibliography of the Social Sciences
International Bibliography of the Social Sciences
DatabaseTitle International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)
DatabaseTitleList
International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)






DeliveryMethod fulltext_linktorsrc
Discipline Economics
Business
EAN 9780521179461
EISBN 9780511835216
0511835213
9781139080750
113908075X
1107714230
9781107714236
1139065890
9781139065894
Edition 1
ExternalDocumentID 9781139065894
9781107714236
9780511835216
652963390
EBC691956
10_1017_CBO9780511835216
Genre Book
GroupedDBID -G2
-VX
089
20A
38.
62J
92J
A4J
AAAAZ
AABBV
AAHFW
AAQLY
ABARN
ABESS
ABFFC
ABMFC
ABMRC
ABZUC
ACCTN
ACLGV
ACNOG
ADCGF
ADQZK
ADVEM
ADWXY
AEDFS
AERYV
AEWAL
AEWQY
AGSJN
AHAWV
AHWGJ
AIAQS
AIXPE
AJFER
AJPFC
AJXXZ
ALMA_UNASSIGNED_HOLDINGS
AMJDZ
ANGWU
ASYWF
AUKZS
AZZ
BBABE
BFIBU
BJUTA
CCHSS
COBLI
COXPH
CZZ
C~9
DLNRW
DUGUG
EBBCW
EBSCA
ECOWB
EDVGL
FH2
FVPQW
ICERG
IDFYU
MYL
OLDIN
OTBUH
OV6
OZASK
OZBHS
PQQKQ
S2E
SACVX
XI1
ZXKUE
ABQPQ
OQ6
8BJ
FQK
JBE
ID FETCH-LOGICAL-a59362-d5f38d413282b63571a24c2c76f665983012a5c8ba26c2bc055f3ca745e9e35b3
ISBN 9781107004368
1107004365
9780521179461
0521179467
IngestDate Mon Jul 21 10:58:13 EDT 2025
Wed Jul 30 03:43:03 EDT 2025
Wed Jul 30 03:48:57 EDT 2025
Wed Jul 30 03:53:21 EDT 2025
Tue Aug 05 04:11:44 EDT 2025
Wed Dec 10 08:49:14 EST 2025
Fri Feb 21 02:33:34 EST 2025
Wed Jul 30 03:57:42 EDT 2025
IsPeerReviewed false
IsScholarly false
LCCN 2011009042
LCCallNum_Ident HD30.23 .V637 2011
Language English
LinkModel OpenURL
MergedId FETCHMERGED-LOGICAL-a59362-d5f38d413282b63571a24c2c76f665983012a5c8ba26c2bc055f3ca745e9e35b3
Notes SourceType-Books-1
ObjectType-Book-1
content type line 7
OCLC 735594214
PQID EBC691956
PQPubID 23473
PageCount 185
ParticipantIDs proquest_miscellaneous_928985252
askewsholts_vlebooks_9781139065894
askewsholts_vlebooks_9781107714236
askewsholts_vlebooks_9780511835216
econis_primary_652963390
proquest_ebookcentral_EBC691956
cambridge_corebooks_10_1017_CBO9780511835216
cambridge_cbo_10_1017_CBO9780511835216
PublicationCentury 2000
PublicationDate 20110509
2011
2013-01-05
2011-05-09
2011-05-30
20110101
PublicationDateYYYYMMDD 2011-05-09
2011-01-01
2013-01-05
2011-05-30
PublicationDate_xml – month: 05
  year: 2011
  text: 20110509
  day: 09
PublicationDecade 2010
PublicationPlace New York
PublicationPlace_xml – name: New York
– name: Cambridge [u.a.]
PublicationSeriesTitle Econometric Society monographs
PublicationYear 2011
2013
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Cambridge Univ. Press
Publisher_xml – name: Cambridge University Press
– name: Cambridge Univ. Press
SSID ssj0000506830
ssib031721344
Score 2.4755244
Snippet Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information...
"Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information...
SourceID proquest
askewsholts
econis
cambridge
SourceType Aggregation Database
Index Database
Publisher
SubjectTerms Decision making
Econometrics
Entscheidungstheorie
Linear programming
Machine theory
Mathematical models
Mathematische Optimierung
Organisationsforschung
Organizational behavior
Organizational behaviour
Subtitle A Linear Programming Approach
TableOfContents Cover -- Half-title -- Series-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- CHAPTER 1: Introduction -- 1.1 OUTLINE -- Chapter 2 -- Chapter 3 -- Chapter 4 -- Chapter 5 -- Chapter 6 -- Chapter 7 -- CHAPTER 2: Arrow's Theorem and Its Consequences -- 2.1 THE INTEGER PROGRAM -- 2.1.1 General Domains -- 2.2 SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS -- 2.2.1 Strategic Candidacy -- 2.3 MECHANISMS AND REVELATION -- CHAPTER 3: Network Flow Problem -- 3.2 NETWORK FLOW PROBLEM -- 3.3 FLOW DECOMPOSITION -- 3.4 THE SHORTEST-PATH POLYHEDRON -- 3.4.1 Interpreting the Dual -- 3.4.2 Infinite Networks -- CHAPTER 4: Incentive Compatibility -- 4.1 NOTATION -- 4.2 DOMINANT STRATEGY INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY -- 4.2.1 2-Cycle Condition -- 4.2.2 Convex Type Spaces -- 4.2.3 Convex Valuations -- 4.3 REVENUE EQUIVALENCE -- 4.3.1 A Demand-Rationing Example -- 4.4 THE CLASSICAL APPROACH -- 4.5 INTERDEPENDENT VALUES -- 4.6 BAYESIAN INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY -- CHAPTER 5: Efficiency -- 5.1 VICKREY-CLARKE-GROVES MECHANISM -- 5.2 COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS -- 5.4 ASCENDING AUCTIONS -- 5.4.1 Primal-Dual Algorithm -- 5.4.2 Incentives -- 5.4.3 Subgradient Algorithm -- An Ascending Implementation of the Subgradient Algorithm -- 5.5 GROSS SUBSTITUTES -- 5.6 AN IMPOSSIBILITY -- 5.7 A RECIPE -- CHAPTER 6: Revenue Maximization -- 6.1 WHAT IS A SOLUTION? -- 6.2 ONE-DIMENSIONAL TYPES -- 6.2.1 A Formulation -- 6.2.2 Optimal Mechanism for Sale of a Single Object -- Dominant Strategy -- 6.2.3 Polyhedral Approach -- Polymatroids -- 6.2.4 Ironing and Extreme Points -- 6.2.5 From Expected Allocations to the Allocation Rule -- 6.2.6 Correlated Types -- 6.2.7 The Classical Approach -- From the Discrete to the Continuous -- Interdependent Values -- 6.3 BUDGET CONSTRAINTS -- 6.3.1 The Continuous Type Case -- 6.4 ASYMMETRIC TYPES -- 6.4.1 Bargaining -- 6.5 MULTIDIMENSIONAL TYPES -- 6.5.1 Wilson's Example
6.5.2 Capacity-Constrained Bidders -- The BNIC Constraints -- Simplification of Incentive Constraints -- Optimal Auction Formulation and Solution -- Monotonicity and the Conditional Virtual Values -- CHAPTER 7: Rationalizability -- 7.1 THE QUASILINEAR CASE -- 7.2 THE GENERAL CASE -- References -- Index
Title Mechanism Design
URI http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511835216
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511835216?locatt=mode:legacy
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/[SITE_ID]/detail.action?docID=691956
http://www.econis.eu/PPNSET?PPN=652963390
https://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=none&isbn=9780511835216
https://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=none&isbn=9781107714236&uid=none
https://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=none&isbn=9781139065894&uid=none
https://www.proquest.com/docview/928985252
Volume v.Series Number 47
hasFullText 1
inHoldings 1
isFullTextHit
isPrint
link http://cvtisr.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwtV1Lb9QwEB7RBQG9AAXUUB4rhDiRKnHi17FdtUICFSRKVXGJbMerVoWk2myr_nzGjw2bLa3EgUuUdbzO2F8Sz9gz3wC8M7zOtJzmqRI6S0uqylSyUqaE1SSrGZrb2pO4fuYHB-L4WH6NSUs7n06AN424upLn_xVqLEOwXejsP8DdN4oFeI6g4xFhx-OKRtz_jAmZrIvidUkv6oFbxlF7Mgsqojqz3Ul0a3Wy2C4k3_7l0mqZ3oMTRQ1E1oM1AR8Zt7wmMAz32h54cwTD0Vl9gX3-r5_RwL002f3iUx6gDYJqWr7CWO3nQOa2bYtCZmuwxhkav3d3vn_68a1f5cpoxkSRxSBh9_Iz7vM1xdvTyIG0uJhHFq5evLiz7Fi-V8VZh3XVneFUgNPEvFvmxnBBYzh6p921CdZrDYePYeQiSZ7AHdtswP1FiMEGPFhEg3dP4VGP2jig9gyO9vcOJx_TmKUiVS4bIklrOi1EjcoAWq_a0fvlipSGGM6mjFGJ3c-JokZoRZgh2mQU_2AUL6mVtqC6eA6jpm3sJowtZVimsfc1Q61BazFFi9RZ7VyjMlUn8Hapy9XlT7-j3lWDcbmlkhtXnqMGfXslxBMVU1km8L4f08rotgougbxahSKBD0sV21ls7ObqmwGf6jxQqlT9c5TAmwVilW8l-ihXe7sTJl1wawLjvgZ-Ct3-lmpse4GyEyEFJZS8uLn9LXj454V5CaP57MK-gnvmcn7azV7Hx_c3UPtmdQ
linkProvider ProQuest Ebooks
openUrl ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fsummon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.title=Mechanism+design&rft.au=Vohra%2C+Rakesh+V&rft.series=Econometric+Society+monographs&rft.date=2011-01-01&rft.pub=Cambridge+Univ.+Press&rft.isbn=9781107004368&rft_id=info:doi/10.1017%2FCBO9780511835216&rft.externalDocID=652963390
thumbnail_m http://cvtisr.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/image/custom?url=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.cambridge.org%2F97805211%2F79461%2Fcover%2F9780521179461.jpg
http://cvtisr.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/image/custom?url=https%3A%2F%2Fvle.dmmserver.com%2Fmedia%2F640%2F97805118%2F9780511835216.jpg
http://cvtisr.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/image/custom?url=https%3A%2F%2Fvle.dmmserver.com%2Fmedia%2F640%2F97811077%2F9781107714236.jpg
http://cvtisr.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/image/custom?url=https%3A%2F%2Fvle.dmmserver.com%2Fmedia%2F640%2F97811390%2F9781139065894.jpg