Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of strategic agents with additive valuation functions. We assume no monetary transfers and, therefore, a mechanism in our setting is an algorithm that takes as input the reported -- rather than the true -- values of the...

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Vydané v:	arXiv.org
Hlavní autori:	Amanatidis, Georgios, Birmpas, Georgios, Fusco, Federico, Lazos, Philip, Leonardi, Stefano, Reiffenhäuser, Rebecca
Médium:	Paper
Jazyk:	English
Vydavateľské údaje:	Ithaca Cornell University Library, arXiv.org 11.12.2023
Predmet:	Algorithms Allocations Design of experiments Equilibrium Reagents
ISSN:	2331-8422
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