Robust Pseudo-Markets for Reusable Public Resources

We study non-monetary mechanisms for the fair and efficient allocation of reusable public resources, i.e., resources used for varying durations. We consider settings where a limited resource is repeatedly shared among a set of agents, each of whom may request to use the resource over multiple consec...

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Bibliographic Details

Published in:	arXiv.org
Main Authors:	Banerjee, Siddhartha, Fikioris, Giannis, Tardos, Éva
Format:	Paper
Language:	English
Published:	Ithaca Cornell University Library, arXiv.org 16.10.2023
Subjects:	Astronomical instruments Bids Budgets Microscopes Particle accelerators Particle telescopes
ISSN:	2331-8422
Online Access:	Get full text
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