From anomalies to forecasts: Toward a descriptive model of decisions under risk, under ambiguity, and from experience

Experimental studies of choice behavior document distinct, and sometimes contradictory, deviations from maximization. For example, people tend to overweight rare events in 1-shot decisions under risk, and to exhibit the opposite bias when they rely on past experience. The common explanations of thes...

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Vydáno v:Psychological review Ročník 124; číslo 4; s. 369
Hlavní autoři: Erev, Ido, Ert, Eyal, Plonsky, Ori, Cohen, Doron, Cohen, Oded
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: United States 01.07.2017
Témata:
Choice Behavior
Decision Making
Emotions
Forecasting
Humans
Models, Psychological
Probability
Risk
Risk-Taking
ISSN:1939-1471, 1939-1471
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Shrnutí:Experimental studies of choice behavior document distinct, and sometimes contradictory, deviations from maximization. For example, people tend to overweight rare events in 1-shot decisions under risk, and to exhibit the opposite bias when they rely on past experience. The common explanations of these results assume that the contradicting anomalies reflect situation-specific processes that involve the weighting of subjective values and the use of simple heuristics. The current article analyzes 14 choice anomalies that have been described by different models, including the Allais, St. Petersburg, and Ellsberg paradoxes, and the reflection effect. Next, it uses a choice prediction competition methodology to clarify the interaction between the different anomalies. It focuses on decisions under risk (known payoff distributions) and under ambiguity (unknown probabilities), with and without feedback concerning the outcomes of past choices. The results demonstrate that it is not necessary to assume situation-specific processes. The distinct anomalies can be captured by assuming high sensitivity to the expected return and 4 additional tendencies: pessimism, bias toward equal weighting, sensitivity to payoff sign, and an effort to minimize the probability of immediate regret. Importantly, feedback increases sensitivity to probability of regret. Simple abstractions of these assumptions, variants of the model (BEAST), allow surprisingly accurate ex ante predictions of behavior. Unlike the popular models, BEAST does not assume subjective weighting functions or cognitive shortcuts. Rather, it assumes the use of sampling tools and reliance on small samples, in addition to the estimation of the expected values. (PsycINFO Database Record
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ISSN:1939-1471
1939-1471
DOI:10.1037/rev0000062